


























CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1125 










An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 













Minimum wage legislation is a standard policy tool in most countries.  However, 
the overall merits of minimum wage are controversial due to its potential adverse 
effects on unemployment.  In this paper we construct a simple model in which 
minimum wage plays an important re-distributive role, alongside income taxation, 
without generating adverse effects on unemployment. 
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 1. Introduction 
Minimum wage legislation is a standard tool in the arsenal of policy measures in most 
developed countries
1. It has attracted much attention by scholars and policy makers. The 
overall merits of minimum wage as a re-distributive tool, as it is commonly perceived by the 
public, are controversial due to its potential adverse effects on employment and high-school 
drop-out
2. This is reflected manifestly in the ongoing debate revolving around the issue.  
The literature on optimal re-distributive taxation following the seminal contribution 
of Mirrlees (1971) reckons with the possibility of low-skill people not working. Note however 
that in this literature, as there are no minimum wages, low-skill people are not forced out of 
the labor market, but rather choose not to work due to the high transfers granted at low 
incomes (thus there is no unemployment), and every worker receives the marginal value of 
product before taxes (in a competitive setting).
3 An exception to the literature is Allen (1989) 
who introduces a standard two-type economy and investigates the potential gains from using 
minimum wage legislation when an optimal income tax system is in place. Allen shows that 
with a linear tax system, minimum wage may be desirable when technology exhibits enough 
complementarity between the low skill and high skill workers. Allen shows further that with a 
non-linear system minimum wage is redundant. Notably, when technology exhibits perfect 
substitutability (as is the case with a standard Mirrlees' economy), minimum wage is not 
desirable. 
In this paper we attempt to show that minimum wage has an important re-distributive 
role, while allowing for a linear technology (a la Mirrlees) and for an optimal general income 
tax system. We do it by introducing a signaling stage prior to the stage where labor market 
                                                  
1The US Congress first instituted a minimum wage with the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to ensure the 
workers a minimally adequate standard of living. 
2 The findings regarding the effect minimum wage legislation bears on employment are ambiguous. Many studies 
find that minimum wages reduce employment [see, e.g., Brown, Gilroy and Kohen (1982), Neumark and Wascher 
(1992, 1994) and Deere, Murphy and Welch (1995)], while other research has brought these findings into question 
[see, e.g., Card, Katz and Krueger (1994) and Card and Krueger (1994)], showing that minimum wages are 
associated with no change or even an increase in employment levels. For articles examining the effect of minimum 
wages on school enrollment status, see Neumark and Wascher (1992, 1996) and Evans and Turner (1995), 
amongst others. 
3 Saez (2002) examines how one can alleviate the lack or participation of low-skill workers in the labor force 
("extensive margin problem") through earned income tax credits. 
  2decisions are taken. We depart from the standard Mirrlees' setting, by allowing for 
asymmetric information between workers and employers with respect to workers' innate 
ability. In such a setup, workers may choose to signal their innate ability.
4 We show that in 
this case, a minimum wage may well be a desirable policy tool. 
The organization of the paper will be as follows. Section 2 presents the model. 
Section 3 establishes the case for minimum wage. We conclude in section 4. 
 
2. The  Model 
Consider a standard two-type Mirrlees' economy, where high type agents constitute a fraction 
1 0 < <γ  of the population. For simplicity, we let 2 / 1 = γ , and normalize the population of 
each type to unity. Earning abilities for the high type and low type individuals are denoted, 
respectively, by 0 > > w w . Innate earning ability is assumed to be private information and, 
unlike the standard model, is observed neither by the firms that hire the workers nor by the 
government. Individuals, prior to the entry into the labor market, may choose to engage in 
some signaling activity (which could take the form of investment in education or taking some 
aptitude tests), thereby transferring the information to the would-be employers. It is assumed 
that the asymmetry in information of the standard model is however maintained, by assuming 
that signaling activities are unobserved (or difficult to interpret) by the government. It is 
assumed that the signaling activity is given by a binary choice, for simplicity, namely, the 
choice whether to purchase the signal or not. We simplify further by setting the acquisition 
cost of the signal at infinity for the low type while denoting by e>0 the finite signaling cost 
incurred by the high type agents, where cost is measured in forgone consumption terms. 
  The standard optimal tax model implicitly assumes a separating equilibrium in the 
signaling game. That is, firms observe agents' types. When signaling costs are sufficiently 
small, signals are acquired and the signaling constraint is non binding and thus does not affect 
the optimal tax system. It is however possible, as we indeed show below, that when signaling 
                                                  
4 A nice survey of signaling models is provided by Riley (1979) who also analyzes the Mirrlees' model in a 
signaling framework. 
  3costs are not negligible, a pooling equilibrium may dominate the separating equilibrium cum 
optimal income tax system.  
  Differences in earning abilities are the only source of heterogeneity in the economy. 
All agents share the same preferences given by some quasi-linear utility function: 
(1)  ,   ) ( ) , ( l h c l c U − =
Where c denotes consumption, l denotes labor and the function h is increasing, strictly convex 
and twice continuously differentiable. 
  As is common in the literature on optimal general income tax, one can describe the 
optimal tax system as a set of gross income - net income (consumption) bundles. Denoting the 
gross income by y, substituting into the utility function in equation (1), one can express the 
utility derived by and individual of type w choosing the income level y and the consumption 
level c as follows: 
(2)    ) / ( ) , ( w y h c y c V
w − =
For later purposes we let  c y y , ,  and c  denote the income levels and consumption levels 
(before deducting signaling costs) derived by the high type and low type, respectively, in the 
optimal tax system. The social planner is seeking to maximize some welfare measure which 
strikes a balance between efficiency and equity considerations. For concreteness, we assume a 
CES welfare measure given by: 
(3)  []
) / 1 (
)] , ( [ )] , ( [
ρ ρ ρ y c V y e c V W
w w + − = ;  
with  ρ measuring the degree of inequality aversion. Note that for ρ =1 we obtain the 
Utilitarian welfare measure whereas for the limit case ofρ −∞ → , we obtain the Rawlsian 
welfare measure. As the parameter ρ  decreases the welfare measure exhibits a stronger 
preference for re-distribution. Assuming a separating equilibrium in the signaling stage, the 
social planner is seeking to solve the following program: 
(4)  []
) / 1 (
)] , ( [ )] , ( [ max
ρ ρ ρ y c V y e c V
w w + −  
 subject  to: 
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w w w ≥ ⇔ − ≥ − V
w  
 (ii)  ) , ( ) , ( y c V y c
w ≥ V
w  
 (iii)  e y c V y c V y c V y e c
w w w ≥ − ⇔ ≥ − ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , (  V
w
 (iv)  0 ) ( ) ≥ − + c y c y ( −  
The inequalities (i)-(iv) describe the self selection constraints (for the high type and low type, 
correspondingly), the signaling constraint and the budget constraint. Suppose that the 
signaling constraint is not binding (although it may well be the case). Then, the standard 
results [see, e.g., Stiglitz (1982) and Balcer and Sadka (1982)] imply that the two binding 
constraints are the incentive constraint for the high type [given by (i)] and the budget 
constraint [given by (iv)]. Zero marginal tax rate (efficiency) at the top income and strictly 
positive marginal tax rate at the bottom income follow from the standard analysis of the first 
order conditions [see Balcer and Sadka (1982)]. 
 
3.  Pooling equilibrium and minimum wage 
3.1  The case for pooling equilibrium   
In the model presented above signaling is an endogenous choice. This may have two 
interesting implications on the optimal tax structure. First, it may be the case that the 
signaling constraint is binding, which limits the scope of re-distribution in the case of a 
separating equilibrium. Second, a pooling equilibrium, if it exists, may dominate the 
separating equilibrium cum optimal tax system. Clearly, in the case of a pooling equilibrium 
in the signaling game there's no scope for re-distribution via the tax system as we obtain full 
re-distribution by the compression of the wage system.
5 Full re-distribution, although it 
entails significant distortions, is something we can never get from an optimal tax system due 
to the informational constraints.  
                                                  
5 Note crucially that pooling of incomes (rather than wages) is undesirable in the two-type case, as it is always 
dominated by the separating equilibrium [See Stiglitz (1982) for a clear presentation of the result]. Note further 
that in the more general case, where there are more than two types, a case for bunching is possible [see Ebert 
(1992)]. 
  5  Ignoring for the moment the question of whether the signaling constraint is binding, 
we turn to examine the case for pooling equilibrium. By pooling equilibrium in the signaling 
game we mean that the high type agents choose to eschew from signaling. Thus the firms are 
unable to distinguish between the low type workers and the high type ones and pay all 
workers the same wage rate which, by virtue of the zero profit and free entry conditions in 
equilibrium, would be equal to the average productivity. Formally, denoting the wage rate in 
the pooling equilibrium by , it follows:  w ˆ
(5)  2 / ) ( ˆ w w w + =  
We denote by   the optimal income (gross and net, given the fact that a re-distributive tax 
system is redundant in the case of pooling) chosen by a typical individual faced with the wage 
rate . Denote the consumption level by
y ˆ
w ˆ ) ˆ ( ˆ y c = . A pooling equilibrium does not have to exist. 
As the government only observes income and not the wage rate, a necessary condition for the 
existence of a pooling equilibrium is the following: 
(6)  e y c V y c V y c V y e c V
w w w w < − ⇔ < − ) ˆ , ˆ ( ) ˆ , ˆ ( ) ˆ , ˆ ( ) ˆ , ˆ (
ˆ ˆ  
Namely, a typical high type agent would find it undesirable to invest in signaling and increase 
her wage rate while choosing the same income earned in the pooling equilibrium by all other 
agents. This is not a sufficient condition though, for the individual can set the income (hence 
consumption) at the optimal level rather than sticking to the economy-wide equilibrium level 
of income. This could reverse the sign of the inequality. It is clear however, that by pooling 
the incomes in equilibrium into a single level (levying high taxes on any other income 
different from ) the necessary condition becomes also a sufficient one.  y ˆ
The question we would like to address next is whether a pooling equilibrium could 
deliver a better social outcome than a separating equilibrium with an optimal tax system. To 
address the question we assume that to begin with (in a tax free environment) a separating 
equilibrium exists. We let the optimal income and consumption levels for the high type and 
  6low type, in the tax free environment, be denoted respectively, by  c y y , ,a n d c. Formally, we 
require then, 
(7)  e y c V y c V
w w ≥ − ) , ( ) , ( 
We further require that a pooling equilibrium may be implemented. Thus condition (6) needs 
to be satisfied. It is easy to verify that the following holds: 
(8)  ) , ( ) ˆ , ˆ ( ) ˆ , ˆ ( ) , (
ˆ y c V y c V y c V y c V
w w w w > > > .  
Thus there exists a large set of signaling costs (lying within a well defined interval) for which 
both (6) and (7) are satisfied for any wage rates 0 > > w w . 
We turn next to compare between the two types of equilibrium. We prove the main 
theorem of the paper. 
Theorem: When the welfare measure exhibits a sufficiently large degree of inequality 
aversion, then for moderate levels of inequality, the pooling equilibrium dominates the 
separating equilibrium with the optimal tax being implemented. 
Proof:  Denote the welfare measures for the separating (when the tax system is in the 
optimum) and pooling equilibrium, respectively, by W and  . Using the notation 
above, it follows that: 
Sep pool W
(9)  []
) / 1 (
)] , ( [ )] , ( [ ) , (
ρ ρ ρ y c V y e c V w w W
w w sep + − = ; 
(10)  ) ˆ , ˆ ( ) , (
ˆ y c V w w W
w pool =  
We would show that when ρ  lies sufficiently close to  ∞ − , and w is sufficiently close tow, 
both types of equilibrium exist for a large set of signaling costs, but the pooling equilibrium 
attains a higher level of welfare than the separating one with the tax system being set 
optimally. 
In view of the maximization program in (4), there are two possibilities to consider in 
the case of a separating equilibrium. It is either the case where the signaling constraint is not 
binding or the one where it binds. We first assume that the constraint is not binding. We 
  7consider the limiting Rawlsian  case, where −∞ → ρ . Note that for the Rawlsian  case, 
) , ( y c V W
w sep = . When w w = , it follows that  w = ˆ w  (hence y y y = = ˆ ) and, obviously, 
, as there is no redistributive taxation in place (no inequality to reduce) and 
(trivially) no signaling. Differentiating the welfare measures in both types of equilibrium with 
respect to 
pool sep W W =
wand evaluating the derivatives at w w = , using the envelope theorem, it follows 
that: 
(11)  0 ) / , ( 2 / 1 ) / , ( >
=
= ⋅ ⋅ > ⋅ =




w y c U
w
y
w y c U






It follows that for wclose enough to w the pooling equilibrium attains a higher level of 
welfare than the separating one for any signaling cost which supports the two equlibria. In 
particular, we can define a neighborhood around w for which the pooling equilibrium 
dominates the separating one, where this neighborhood does not depend on the signaling cost. 
Now fix some win this neighborhood. Then for any signaling cost which satisfies both (6) 
and (7), which we already showed to exist (there are infinitely many such costs) the claim of 
the theorem is established.  
  We turn next to the case where the signaling constraint is binding. Clearly, the 
welfare measure of the separating equilibrium is reduced relative to the calculated measure 
that ignored the fact that the constraint was binding, for the same set of parameters. This 
reinforces the advantage of the pooling equilibrium.  
Last note that the result extends to welfare measures exhibiting a sufficient degree of 
inequality aversion by virtue of the continuity of the welfare measure with respect to  ρ .This 
concludes the proof. QED 
 
3.2  The case for minimum wage 
In the game-theoretical literature on implementation there is a clear distinction between 
implementation and full implementation. The former refers to a framing of a game such that 
  8one of its equilibria (potentially many) supports a certain outcome (say a social goal). The 
latter refers to the case where the outcome is implemented but there are no other equilibria of 
the game which support outcomes other than the desirable one. Implementing the pooling 
equilibrium is easy. We can set the tax system to pool all income levels at  . Then a pooling 
equilibrium exists because high type agents have no motivation to distinguish themselves by 
virtue of (6). However this is not the end of the story, as there is still a possibility of a 
separating equilibrium (in the signaling game) but pooling at the income level, which, as we 
already mentioned, is strictly dominated by the separating equilibrium where the two types 
earn different incomes (the standard case). For instance, when the signaling constraint (iii) in 
the maximization formulation at (4) is not binding in the optimum, indeed such a pooling –
separating equilibrium necessarily exists. To see that, note that when the constraint is not 
binding, then by virtue of the 
y ˆ
binding incentive compatibility constraint for the high type [(i) 
in (4)], the signaling constraint (iii) can be re-written as follows:  e y c V y c
w w > ) , ( , (. V  W e  
need to show that the following holds: 
− )
e y c V y c
w w ≥ − ) ˆ , ˆ ( ) ˆ , ˆ ( V . It therefore suffices to show 
that:  ) , ( ) , ( ) ˆ , ˆ ( ) ˆ , ˆ ( y c V y c V y c V y c
w w w w − ≥ − V , which (by substitution) holds if and only if the 
following is satisfied:  ) / ( ) / ( ) / ˆ ( ) / ˆ ( w y h w y h w y h w y h − ≥ − . To establish the last inequality, 
let ) / ( ) / ( ) , , ( w y h w y h w w y g − = . It is easy to verify that by virtue of the convexity of h, 
g'(y)>0. The result follows from the fact that y y > ˆ . We provide a simple example where h is 
quadratic in the appendix, which illustrates the point. In the example, the pooling-separating 
equilibrium exists even when the signaling constraint is binding.  
In order to ensure that the inferior separating equilibrium does not exist, an 
introduction of minimum wage is called for. Suppose we set the minimum wage just equal 
to . The minimum wage does not allow firms to offer low type agents a wage offer which 
equals their productivity in a separating equilibrium. This is not the end of the story yet, for 
this might lead to the possibility in which the low-type agents will be crowded out of the 
market into unemployment. This will form a separating equilibrium. To ensure that such 
w ˆ
  9equilibrium does not exist we need to introduce a payroll tax levied on firms, which depends 
on the level of unemployment in the economy. Set the tax equal to zero when unemployment 
is zero, and sufficiently high otherwise. Setting the tax sufficiently high will preclude the 
possibility of unemployment in equilibrium.
6  
We conclude that in general, fully implementing the socially desirable pooling 
equilibrium requires the introduction of a minimum wage combined with employment 
dependent payroll tax system (experience rating). The appendix provides an illustrative 
example where minimum wage is desirable. 
 
4. Conclusions 
We develop a model of wage setup with asymmetric information between workers and firms. 
In this model there could be two types of equilibrium: one is a separating equilibrium with 
each worker perfectly signaling her type and being remunerated accordingly. Another 
possibility is a pooling equilibrium where wages are pooled. We show that when inequality is 
moderate and the welfare measure exhibits enough inequality-aversion, the pooling 
equilibrium is preferable. This equilibrium obtains full redistribution (a goal that is never 
attained in a Mirrlees' model) on the one hand, while on the other hand entails inefficiency in 
the form of an excessive workload for the low skilled agents and a lower than optimum 
workload for the skilled individuals. A minimum wage is required in order to rule out the 
separating equilibrium and ensure that the pooling equilibrium prevails. 
 
                                                  
6 Formally, let l(w) denote the labor supply of an agent faced with a wage rate w. The profit that a firm would 
derive from a worker of high type is then bounded above by:  ) ( ] [ w l w w w ⋅ − max . Setting the payroll tax higher 
than the solution to the maximization problem would establish the result. 
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Consider the following simple example. Suppose that preferences are given by 
. Suppose a Rawlsian social planner. Further assume that 2 / ) , (
2 l c l c U − = 100 = w ,  110 = w  
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By substituting the binding constraints into the objective function, one can hence turn the 
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Formulating the first-order conditions yields: 
(A3) 
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Substituting back into the objective function in (A2), re-arranging and simplifying, yields the 
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Comparing (A5) and (A6) it follows that the pooling equilibrium dominates. 
We turn next to verify that the signaling constraint is not binding. Formally, using the 































In words – a high type agent will benefit from engaging in signaling, when the optimal tax 
system is in place. Substitution into (A7) yields that the left-hand-side is equal to 630. This 
establishes the result by recalling that e=550. 
Next we turn to verify that condition (6) in the main body of the paper is satisfied. 
Namely, that the necessary condition for a pooling equilibrium exists. Formally, the condition 





























In words – the condition requires that given that all income groups are pooled together, a high 
type agent would refrain from revealing his type via signaling in equilibrium. Substitution 
into (A8) yields that the left-hand-side is equal to 490. This establishes the result. 
Last we show that minimum wage legislation is not redundant; namely, that otherwise 
a separating equilibrium in the signaling game (while a pooling of income groups) exists. 





























Note that y y > ˆ . Thus the condition in (A7) implies the condition given in (A9). The result is 
thus established.  
  14Last note that the range of signaling cost for which the results hold is given by the 
interval (490,630). Note further that in the example the high wage to low wage ratio is modest 
and given by 110/100=1.1. This is done in order to construct a scenario where the signaling 
constraint is not binding – which requires limited wage dispersion. It is however easy to show 
that the dominance of the pooling equilibrium extends to significant levels of earnings 
inequality. Employing the same quasi-linear quadratic utility form and assuming again a 
Rawlsian planner, one can show numerically that by setting e=5,000 and  190 = w , the pooling 
equilibrium would still dominate the separating equilibrium. In this case the signaling 
constraint would be binding. Moreover, for the new parametric assumption, it would still hold 
that setting the minimum wage equal to the average productivity would be necessary to 
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